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Using four waves of data from the Participation Labour Unemployment Survey,
a database of information on the Italian labour market supply, we address
the question of earnings dispersion by applying a ‘nested’ decomposition
procedure of the Theil inequality measure, which combines into a uniﬁed
framework the standard decompositions by population subgroups and income
sources. The empirical evidence obtained points to the key role played by the
self-employees in shaping labour income inequality, especially at the upper
extreme of the earnings distribution, and the emergence of non-standard forms
of employment as an important feature of the contemporary workplace.
Keywords: labour income; size distribution; inequality
JEL Classiﬁcations: D33, D63
1. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, and at least up to the onset of the current economic crisis,
labour market outcomes improved substantially in Italy. Between 1995 and 2007,
the most recent year unaffected by the crisis, about 2.5 million jobs were created
(mostly in dependent employment) and almost 3 million people entered the work-
force (Checchi 2014). Spurred by the positive developments in employment and
labour force participation, the unemployment rate declined to around 6% in 2007,
about half its 1995 peak of over 12% (Schindler 2009).1 However, such improve-
ments were accompanied by poor productivity growth (Lucidi 2007; Codogno 2009;
Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010) and a structural deterioration of Italy’s competitive-
ness (Barca 2005; Faini and Sapir 2009; Codogno 2009). In particular, starting by
the end of the 1990s, growth in labour productivity has been modest, even negative
in some years, and as a result its level has recently come to be low compared to that
prevailing in the early 1990s and other industrialised countries.2 At the same time,
the growth of jobs coincided with a modest real wage growth – a yearly increase of
0.7% during 1996–2007 (Checchi 2014).
The trends outlined above coincided with a period of intense reforms entered by
the Italian labour market. Key among them were the reform of the bargaining system
of the early 1990s – which introduced the collective bargaining framework still in
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use – and several labour market reforms aimed to increase the employment rate by
means of expansion in labour market ﬂexibility.
The collective bargaining structure laid out in 1993 closed the period of
automatic wage indexation (the so-called Scala mobile) which dated back to the
mid-1970s. The new bargaining arrangements consist of a national-sectoral bargain-
ing level and a second one decentralised at regional or ﬁrm level. At the central
(national) level, ﬁrms and trade unions deﬁne general employment conditions and
act for preservation of the purchasing power of real wages with periodic inﬂation
compensations. At the local level, ﬁrm and unions negotiate possible rents redistri-
bution on the basis of productivity performances with the objective of enhancing
wage ﬂexibility. However, second-level agreements are optional and cannot deﬁne
wages lower than the sectoral minimum. This has limited to some extent the use of
decentralised bargaining, especially among small ﬁrms characterised by a low degree
of trade unionisation. As a result, annual wage distributions have appeared more
compressed than was expected (see for example Casadio 2003, Checchi and Pagani
2005, and Dell Aringa and Pagani 2007).3
With regards to the pursuit of labour market efﬁciency, starting from the end of
the 1990s some legislative measures have been speciﬁcally directed at fostering ﬂex-
ibility through an increase of the so-called ‘atypical’ or ‘non-standard’ forms of
employment. More speciﬁcally, the measures introduced by the Law 196/1997
(Legge Treu, named after then Labour Minister Tiziano Treu) ampliﬁed ﬂexibility by
extending the set of temporary contracts and providing incentives for part-time
work. The Law 30/2003 (Legge Biagi, named after the advisor on labour market
reforms under the 2001–2006 Berlusconi government) further deregulated the use of
temporary agency work4 and introduced new forms of atypical work such as on-call
jobs, job sharing and occasional work. Moreover, the latter reform has given a great
thrust to the extensive use of collaboration workers – namely, holders of continuous
and coordinated collaboration contracts (Collaborazioni coordinate e continuative, or
Co.co.co) and contracts linked to a speciﬁc project (Collaborazioni continuative a
progetto, or Co.co.pro) – who, although formally self-employed, often work as if
they were normal employees.5 The large adoption (abuse) of such labour relation-
ships beneﬁted of their more proﬁtable compulsory pension contributions with
respect to both standard and ﬁxed-term employment. Furthermore, if on one hand
collaboration works allow employers to save labour costs, on the other hand, being
a real Italian peculiarity, their inclusion in the category of temporary employment
makes the incidence of atypical workers substantially higher in the Italian labour
market than in other European countries (Ballarino et al. 2013).
The changes in institutional framework embraced by the Italian labour market
during the last two decades certainly contributed to the growth in aggregate employ-
ment. However, the crisis has shown that this employment growth has been just a
transitional ‘honeymoon’, growthless job creating effect (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007):
since most of the new positions created were temporary and part-time works, almost
800,000 jobs disappeared in the 2009 crisis (Checchi 2014). Indeed, the number of
workers in temporary work arrangements more than doubled between 1995 and
2007, and part-time employment increased by 65% during that time; permanent and
full-time jobs, instead, grew respectively by only 7% and 9% over the same years
(Schindler 2009).6 Furthermore, the employment gains since 1995 occurred at the
expense of real wage growth: in fact, a phase of relevant wage moderation took
place since the change of the contractual arrangements, causing real wages to
2 F. Clementi and M. Giammatteo
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increase on average less than labour productivity and leading to a decline of the
labour share on national income (Tronti 2007; Pugliese 2008).7 Several authors have
also demonstrated how the prolonged period of wage moderation and the increased
ﬂexibility translated into small labour productivity growth, as the reduction of ﬁrms’
wage bill makes worthwhile the preservation of low-productive jobs and labour-
intensive productive processes, thereby reducing the incentives for ﬁrms to innovate
and their scope for training activities and high quality human resource management
practices (e.g. Lucidi 2007; but see also Stirati 2008, Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010,
Cappellari et al. 2012, and Cutuli and Guetto 2013).
Under a distributional perspective, while paying out in terms of employment
growth, the increased labour market – mainly achieved through a series of reforms
‘at the margin’ that liberalised the use of temporary contracts but left largely
unchanged the legislation applying to permanent workers – has led to a strong
segmentation of the Italian labour market, where highly protected and well-paid
permanent jobs coexist along with risky and low-paid temporary occupations
(Barbieri and Scherer 2009).8 This has exacerbated existing earnings inequalities
between standard and non-standard forms of employment:9 recent econometric
studies have indeed shown the existence of a wage differential between temporary
and regular employees that has been estimated to range between 7% and 25%
(Picchio 2006; Cutuli 2008; Lucidi and Raitano 2009a,b; OECD 2012).
Another major factor of inequality in the Italian labour market is related to work-
ers’ condition as employees and self-employed: Italy’s self-employment rate stands
out among the industrialised countries (Barbieri and Bison 2004) and the role of
self-employment income in explaining the recent Italian inequality trend has been
documented by several studies (see, among others, Torrini 2005, 2006, Quintano
et al. 2006, Rani 2008, Fiorio 2011, and Ballarino et al. 2013). Moreover, the Italian
distribution of labour earnings showed a persistent increasing pattern in top income
shares since the mid-1980s, mainly driven by top wages and self-employment
income (Alvaredo and Pisano 2010). Recently, the OECD (2011, p. 3) stated that in
Italy ‘changes in self-employment income were important drivers of increased earn-
ings inequality: their share in total earned income has increased by 10% since the
mid-1980s, and self-employment income seems more predominant among high earn-
ers, to the contrary of many other OECD countries’.
Drawing from these recent labour market developments, in the present work we
provide new empirical evidence on the distribution of earnings in Italy, focusing in
particular on the inequality consequences of the Italian employment composition as
dominated by a large share of self-employment and recently affected by labour mar-
ket ﬂexibility reforms. In order to avoid using partial measures that only focus on
limited parts of the overall distribution, or average wage differentials arising
between speciﬁc subpopulations, we apply a ‘nested’ decomposition of the Theil
inequality index by population subgroups and income sources, which allows us to
investigate how much of the dispersion in earnings concentrated in different parts of
the distribution might be accounted for by alternative sources of labour income
(standard, self-employment and atypical). There are indeed many reasons to explore
inequality in different parts of the distribution. For example, the same degree
of inequality can lead to different economic outcomes, depending on whether the
inequality is more pronounced in the lower tail of the distribution or in the top end
(Morris et al. 1994; Voitchovsky 2005). Additionally, using wage differentials ‘at
International Review of Applied Economics 3
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the mean’ would not accurately reﬂect the differences across complete earnings
distribution (e.g. Van Kerm 2013).
The analysis is conducted with the data of the Participation Labour Unemploy-
ment Survey (PLUS), a sample survey on the Italian labour market supply carried
out by ISFOL for the years 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2010.10 Despite its limited time
span, this dataset may be useful to pin down the role that alternative sources of
labour earnings play as determinants of income distribution and inequality among
workers, particularly for the special emphasis given to the investigation of atypical
contracts.
The rest of the work goes on as follows: Section 2 describes the data and
methodology adopted for the analysis; Section 3 details the results and ﬁndings;
Section 4 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2. Data and methodology
The PLUS survey consists of four waves of data conducted in 2005, 2006, 2008 and
2010 on around 38,000 individuals – of which 16,000 were workers of both public
and private sectors – belonging to the Italian population aged 18–64.11 Complemen-
tary to other key national statistical sources,12 the core objective of PLUS is that of
providing reliable estimates of rare and only marginally explored labour market
issues. In particular, it is devoted to the study of the distribution of contract types
(employee/self-employed status and their articulated subclassiﬁcations), job search
activity, young and women employment participation, old-age activity and retire-
ment choice, pattern of education and other training, intergenerational dynamics, etc.
Some of the key prerogatives of the PLUS survey that seem worthwhile are high-
lighted here are as follows:
(i) it is planned with the chief purpose of providing accurate estimates of very
small-scale phenomena, in that it allows us to produce consistent
evaluations of population aggregates of about 100,000 individuals with a
coefﬁcient of variation lower than 10% (for example, the contract type
composition of Italian total employment is annually estimated at a degree
of desegregation that allows reliable analyses of ﬁxed-term/atypical job
distribution);13
(ii) consistent labour income variables are derived through the implementation
of appropriate techniques in the questionnaire design (e.g. with differentia-
tion of the interview submission process by type of worker), consolidation
of respondents’ loyalty (for panel units), and thorough data processing
(multiple data check and imputation);
(iii) only survey respondents are included (absence of proxy interviews),
reducing in this way the extent of measurement errors and partial non-
responses.
The variable chosen for the analysis is the monthly ‘gross income’ normalised on
annual basis14 earned by workers classiﬁed according to the following categories:
standard employees, self-employed and atypical workers. The ﬁrst category is made
up of standard dependent workers with open-ended contracts, which we consider as
the traditional dependent employment relationship. The self-employed group, in
turn, consists of standard autonomous occupations, such as entrepreneurs,
4 F. Clementi and M. Giammatteo
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cooperative partners, artisans, farmers and other independent jobs (lawyers, doctors
and further professional people). Finally, the atypical category brings together non-
standard works of both dependent and autonomous employment relationships,
including, among others,15 the ‘continuous and coordinated contractual relationship’.
The latter form of employment relationship, formally autonomous for the Italian
labour legislation, covers both genuine independent workers and – more frequently
– false independent (or ‘economically dependent’) workers. Although the PLUS
survey allows us to establish the subordination level of labour positions that are
midway between dependent and self-employed workers,16 we deem to be signiﬁcant
the divergence of atypical jobs from traditional employment relationships.
As we have said, the main objective of this paper is to determine how much of
the dispersion in earnings concentrated in different parts of the distribution may be
accounted for by alternative sources of labour income. For this purpose, we shall
distinguish in the following between two groups of high- and low-income earners,
or ‘rich’ and ‘non-rich’. Such groups may be deﬁned in a number of different
ways,17 but as noted by (Atkinson 2006) all of the deﬁnitions used in the existing
literature are affected by arbitrariness, and many of them miss the possibility that
the ‘rich’ and ‘non-rich’ groups are changing proportions of the population. There-
fore, in order to limit the subjectivity in deﬁnition we follow the method proposed
by Inhaber and Carroll (1992; but see also Cowell 2011 for a similar approach)
who, based on changes in the shape of the income distribution curve, deﬁne the
‘rich’ as those found on the part of the curve whose shape is similar to the classical
Pareto (1895, 1896, 1897a, b) model, which is usually considered as a good approx-
imation of the upper tail of the income distribution.18 The threshold dividing ‘rich’
from ‘non-rich’ is given in this case by the minimum possible income found in the
distribution function
FðxÞ ¼ 1 x
xmin
 a
; xmin x\1; xmin; a[ 0 (1)
which we estimate from the data by adopting a numerical technique proposed by
Clauset et al. (2007, 2009) based on minimizing the ‘distance’ between the statistical
model (1) and the empirical data. The fundamental idea behind this technique is
simple: we choose the estimate of the lowest income xmin that makes the probability
distributions of the measured data and the best-ﬁt Pareto model as similar as
possible above x^min. Speciﬁcally, for each possible xmin we ﬁrst obtain the estimate
of the shape parameter a over the data x xmin by using the conditional maximum
likelihood estimator introduced by Hill (1975)
a^H ¼ 1m
Xm1
i¼1
ðln xniþ1  ln xnmþ1Þ
" #1
(2)
where m ¼ n k þ 1 is the number of extreme sample values above the threshold, n
is the sample size and k is the rank of the order statistic xn–m+1, and then we
compute the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) goodness-of-ﬁt statistic
D ¼ maxx xmin jF^ðxÞ  Fðx ; xmin; a^HÞ (3)
between the empirical cumulative distribution of the data points being ﬁt, F^ðxÞ, and
the theoretical Pareto cumulative distribution function with parameters xmin and a^H,
International Review of Applied Economics 5
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i.e. Fðx; xmin; a^HÞ. Our optimal estimate of the lowest income, x^min, is then the value
of xmin where D attains its minimum, from which we infer the optimal sample frac-
tion, m*, and the optimal estimate of the shape parameter, a^H.
Once the parameters have been estimated, by exploiting the asymptotic distribu-
tion theory of the Hill estimator (2) we calculate the standard error of the shape
parameter as a^

Hﬃﬃﬃ
m
p  (e.g. Lux 1996), whereas the uncertainty in the estimate for xmin is
derived by making use of a nonparametric bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani
1993). That is, given our n income measurements, we generate a synthetic dataset
by drawing a new sequence of points xi, i ¼ 1; . . .; n, uniformly at random from the
original data. Using the method described above, we then estimate xmin for this
surrogate dataset. By taking the standard deviation of all the estimates over a large
number of repetitions of this process,19 we can quantify our uncertainty in the
original estimated parameter.
Finally, we also perform a K-S goodness-of-ﬁt test of the Pareto distribution
for the observations above x^min by generating a p-value that quantiﬁes the plausi-
bility of the hypothesised model.20 In detail, our procedure is as follows. First, we
ﬁt our empirical data to the Pareto model using the method described above and
calculate the K-S statistic (3) for this ﬁt. Next, we generate a large number of syn-
thetic datasets having m observations randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution
with shape parameter a and lower bound xmin equal to those of the distribution that
best ﬁts the observed data. We ﬁt each synthetic dataset individually to the Pareto
distribution and calculate the K-S statistic for each one relative to its own model.21
Then we simply count what fraction of the time the resulting statistic is larger than
the value for the empirical data. This fraction is the p-value for the ﬁt, and can be
interpreted in the standard way: if it is larger than the chosen signiﬁcance level,
then the difference between the empirical data and the model can be attributed to
statistical ﬂuctuations alone; if it is smaller, the model is not a plausible ﬁt to the
data.
With regard to the inequality analysis, the methodology we shall follow is based
on a nested procedure of decomposition of the Theil (1967) index that combines into
a simultaneous approach the standard decompositions by population subgroups
(which separates total inequality in within- and between-group components) and
income sources (which divides overall inequality into proportional factor
contributions).
Despite the Gini-based multi-decomposition of inequality proposed by Mussard
(2004, 2006), the choice of the Theil index as the reference measure of inequality is
motivated by two main reasons: (i) it allows perfect (subgroups) decomposability22
and (ii) satisﬁes the fundamental property of uniform addition for source-based
decomposition.23 A third, not trivial, advantage is given by its simple and very
‘smart’ structure. More precisely, it is derivable as a linear function of three basic
elements: (pseudo-)Theil subindices of inequality (for groups and income sources),
population shares and income shares. In other words, it allows to separate ‘size’ and
‘spread’ determinants of inequality both at the subgroup and income source level
through the explicit reference to aggregates with economic relevance.
As shown in Appendix A, we can enclose into a uniﬁed framework the standard
subpopulation and income source decompositions by deriving the following
(weighted) bidimensional formulation of the Theil index
6 F. Clementi and M. Giammatteo
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TðY Þ ¼
XM
m¼1
XK
k¼1
Pk
lmkðwÞ
lðwÞ
ln
lkðwÞ
lðwÞ
" #
þ
XM
m¼1
XK
k¼1
Pk
lkðwÞ
lðwÞ
Xnk
i¼1
pi
ymik
lkðwÞ
ln
yik
lkðwÞ
" #( )
¼
XM
m¼1
TbwðmÞ þ
XM
m¼1
TwwðmÞ ¼ Tbw þ Tww ð4Þ
where pi represents the individual weight,
24 Pk is the sum of the sample weights pi
(i ¼ 1; . . .; nk) for group k, while lðwÞ, lkðwÞ and lmkðwÞ are, respectively, the weighted
means for the total, kth subgroup and mth source of the kth subgroup
distributions.25 Expression (4) implicitly deﬁnes the pseudo-Theil of the Ym distribu-
tion, TwðmÞ ¼ TbwðmÞ þ TwwðmÞ, i.e. the absolute contribution to total inequality of
the component m. It is important to observe that TwðmÞ does not measure the m
source inequality,26 as incomes in total and partial distributions have different ranks
and the weights are those corresponding to the total distribution. Note also that
while the global index TðY Þ is always positive, the generic absolute contribution
TwðmÞ can assume both positive and negative values. Hereafter, we shall use the
expression of inequality increasing (decreasing) source for the income component
showing a positive (negative) value of TwðmÞ. Similarly, we can deﬁne TbwðmÞ as
the generic m source contribution to between-group inequality (‘between-group
pseudo-Thei’) and TwwðmÞ as the m source contribution to within-group inequality
(‘within-group pseudo-Theil’).
The bidimensional decomposition (4) provides a wider set of possible inequality
determinants than those that would be obtained by applying separate decomposi-
tions. In particular, we are able to distinguish among positive and negative
subeffects on within- and between-group inequality components independently on
the sign of the overall source contributions. More precisely:
(i) standard subgroup decomposition provides aggregated within and between
components of total inequality declining any information on additional
source-based determinants;
(ii) simple income source decompositions fail to distinguish in which way
income subcomponents affect total inequality through (equalising or not
equalising) effects within subpopulations or between them.
The nested approach enforces both the subpopulation and income source decom-
positions, also representing a useful instrument for the analysis of the inequality con-
sequences of speciﬁc government policies (transfers or tax programmes, labour
market reforms, etc).27
3. Empirical results
Using the data and methods described earlier, in this section we ﬁt the classical
Pareto model (1) to the upper tail of the Italian labour income distributions and
analyse the extent to which the level of inequality within and between the two
groups that we consider, respectively, as the ‘rich’ and the ‘non-rich’ is affected by
earnings accruing from different sources.
The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that the Pareto distributional
assumption may be appropriate in our case. Indeed, there are two noticeable
International Review of Applied Economics 7
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [F
ab
io 
Cl
em
en
ti]
 at
 07
:55
 10
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
features. First, the labour income distribution in any one year displays statistically
signiﬁcant evidence for skewness. This can also be inferred by looking at the
difference between median and mean income, the former being consistently lower
than the latter in each year. Second, the level of kurtosis is signiﬁcantly above the
normal threshold in any one of the years concerned, hinting to the presence of a
thick upper tail.
The Pareto diagrams shown in panel (c) of Figure 1 through 4 reveal the extent
of what is suggested by Table 1. These diagrams are plots of the annual gross
income x, charted on a logarithmic scale, against the complementary cumulative
distribution of individuals with annual gross income greater than or equal to x (also
on a log scale). The distinctive feature of distributions that follow the Pareto model
in the upper tail – i.e. the approximate linearity above some lower bound of their
complementary cumulative distributions plotted on a double logarithmic scale – is
clearly evident when examining these graphs, and we can therefore apply the
estimation method discussed in Section 2 to make a stronger case for the Pareto
hypothesis.
The results of ﬁtting the Pareto distribution to each of the years of data are sum-
marised in Table 2. As can be seen, the model ﬁt varied slightly across years but
was generally excellent. This is demonstrated ﬁrst by the precision of the parameter
estimates. All t-ratios were indeed signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level and relatively large –
for example, the smallest t-ratio for any estimate of xmin was slightly less than 4 and
was typically at least seven times larger for a. Excellent goodness of ﬁt is also dem-
onstrated by the complementary cumulative distribution plots shown in panel (c) of
Figures 1 to 4, where the Pareto model (solid line) exhibits a remarkable agreement
with the data in the upper tail of the distributions, even when the latter gets quite
noisy (as, for example, in 2008). Furthermore, a look at the Hill plots displayed in
panel (b) of the same ﬁgures conﬁrms that this model is a good match to the data,
Table 1. Sample statistics.
Wave
2005 2006 2008 2010
Obs 15,868 16,475 15,299 16,587
Pop. (’000) 21,570 22,619 22,970 22,434
Min 472 231 293 286
p25 11,802 11,094 11,131 10,876
Med. 14,612 14,458 15,042 14,698
p75 18,597 18,574 18,953 18,519
Max 236,035 288,906 392,284 383,305
Mean 17,967 17,182 17,403 17,126
St. dev. 16,786 15,195 18,732 18,869
Skewnessa 5.97 6.87 9.10 10.47
(<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)†
Kurtosisb 55.87 82.81 121.91 160.36
(<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)†
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data.
aNumbers in round brackets: p-values for the D’Agostino (1970) skewness test; the null hypothesis is
H0: normality versus the alternative H1: non-normality due to skewness.
bNumbers in round brackets: p-values for the Anscombe and Glynn (1983) kurtosis test; the null
hypothesis is H0: normality versus the alternative H1: no-nnormality due to excess kurtosis.
†Signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
8 F. Clementi and M. Giammatteo
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Figure 1. Pareto distribution ﬁt for the PLUS 2005 wave.
Table 2. Parameter estimates and goodness-of-ﬁt test for the Pareto distribution ﬁt.a
Wave m x^min a^

H Dmin
b
2005 3,291 19,925 1.962 0.061
(4.673)† (57.706)† (0.906)
2006 3,345 19,946 2.225 0.069
(3.898)† (58.553)† (0.920)
2008 3,512 18,953 2.239 0.061
(6.407)† (58.921)† (0.926)
2010 1,083 28,612 1.916 0.074
(4.453)† (33.034)† (0.952)
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data.
Legend: m = optimal number of observations in the upper tail to be used for estimation of the shape
parameter; x^min = optimal estimate of the lower income limit; a^

H = optimal estimate of the shape
parameter; Dmin = minimum value attained by the K-S statistic.
aNumbers in round brackets: t-ratios using standard errors estimated by the methods described in
Section 2.
bNumbers in round brackets: p-values computed via 5,000 Monte Carlo replications; the null hypothesis
for the test is that the Pareto distribution is a statistically good approximation to the model generating
the data.
†Signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
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since beyond the cut-off income values used the estimates of the shape parameter
appear roughly stable.28
As a more objective indication of the suitability of the Pareto model, Table 2
reports for each wave the K-S statistic that yields the best ﬁt to the tail data (dashed
line in panel (a) of Figures 1–4) and the Monte Carlo p-value for the goodness-of-ﬁt
test. Notice how all p-values are very close to unity, meaning that in all cases our
data can be ﬁrmly considered to follow the Pareto distribution in the upper tail. This
is conﬁrmed by visual inspection of the Pareto Q-Q plots of the sample quantiles
above x^min, shown in panel (d) of the ﬁgures.
29 As can be seen, every plot lies extre-
mely close to the reference line, and much closer than is typically observed in plots
of this type.
It must also be noticed that the size of the group here considered as the ‘rich’
shrank dramatically in 2010. Indeed, based on the results reported in Table 2, the
optimal number of tail observations used in the estimation of the Pareto distribution
showed in that year a decline by approximately 70% with respect to 2008, while in
contrast only few signiﬁcant changes are detected in the preceding years. This is a
probable consequence of the economic crisis started in 2008–2009 in the wake of
the global ﬁnancial crisis, which caused a fall in real mean and median income of
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Figure 2. Pareto distribution ﬁt for the PLUS 2006 wave.
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about 2% between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 1). This hypothesis seems also con-
ﬁrmed by the results of a relative distribution analysis, which allows for a decompo-
sition of the relative income density between 2008 and 2010 so as to isolate changes
occurring along the entire income range due to differences in the ﬁrst moment.30
Indeed, from inspection of Figure 5 one can see that the mean downshift between
2008 and 2010 impacted the whole range of the income distribution with varying
intensity, affecting more negatively the mass of workers above the 2008 median.
More speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure displays a decline of the mass in the upper tail above
the 70th percentile and a relatively small increase in the upper-median range of the
share of workers between approximately the 65th and the 70th percentile of
the 2008 distribution, thus indicating a clear convergence of higher incomes toward
the center.31
Having provided strong evidence for the presence of a Pareto tail in the Italian
labour income distribution, we now turn to assessing earnings inequality through
decomposition exercises. The situation is summarised in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 contains for each wave of data standard distributional measures, such as
population and income shares and relative means. Standard employees represented
Order statistic (k)
K−
S 
st
at
is
tic
 (D
)
Dmin = 0.061
k∗ = 11,788
Number of observations in the upper tail (m)
α^H
∗
 = 2.239
m∗ = 3,512
C
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
0.
00
01
0.
00
1
0.
01
0.
1
1
x^min
∗
 = 18,953
Pareto model
Transformed data above the optimal threshold
Ex
po
ne
nt
ia
l q
ua
nt
ile
s
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
0 3200 6400 9600 12800 16000 0 3200 6400 9600 12800 16000
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.
5
1.
2
1.
9
2.
6
3.
3
4.
0
Reference line
Gross income ( , 1995 prices)
H
ill 
es
tim
at
e 
(α
H
)
^
Figure 3. Pareto distribution ﬁt for the PLUS 2008 wave.
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in each year around 64% of total population and received on average 61% of total
income. From 2005 to 2010, the self-employed decreased both their population and
income shares, while atypical workers followed a reversed trend until 2008. As
regards the relative mean, for standard employees it ranges between 90% in 2005
and 98% in 2010; for the self-employed the percentage increased from 148% in
2005 to 155% in 2008, whereas in 2010 it decreased to 132%; ﬁnally, the mean of
atypical workers relative to that of the whole population was around 68% over the
whole period.
By considering the subgroups made up of individuals with income \x^min (‘non-
rich’) and  x^min (‘rich’), we observe that: (i) the population and income shares of
the non-rich decreased between 2005 and 2008 and increased in 2010; (ii) this evi-
dence is reversed for the rich group; (iii) the relative mean income of each group
was fairly stable until 2008 (around 70% for the non-rich and 190% for the rich)
and raised in 2010, notably for the rich.
Table 3 also shows the estimates and corresponding standard errors for both the
Theil and Gini measures of inequality. The Theil index for total gross income grew
from 0.249 in 2005 to 0.269 in 2010, save for a temporary decrease in 2006. The
estimated Gini exhibited a similar pattern of change. At the same time, the two
Order statistic (k)
K−
S 
st
at
is
tic
 (D
)
Dmin = 0.074
k∗ = 15,505
Number of observations in the upper tail (m)
0
6
α^H
∗
 = 1.916
m∗ = 1,083
C
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
0.
00
01
0.
00
1
0.
01
0.
1
1
x^min
∗
 = 28,612
Pareto model
Transformed data above the optimal threshold
Ex
po
ne
nt
ia
l q
ua
nt
ile
s
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
0 3400 6800 10200 13600 17000 0 3400 6800 10200 13600 17000
12
18
24
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
1.
3
2.
1
2.
9
3.
7
4.
5
5.
3
Reference line
Gross income ( , 1995 prices)
H
ill 
es
tim
at
e 
(α
H
)
^
Figure 4. Pareto distribution ﬁt for the PLUS 2010 wave.
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indices reveal sharp inequality heterogeneity both at the population subgroup and
income source levels. In particular, self-employed and atypical earning distributions
are characterised by high levels of income disparities. However, it is worthwhile to
underline that either the ranks and changes of the inequality measured by the two
indices are always consistent across the years, thus suggesting the robustness of our
ﬁndings.
Table 4 presents the results of the standard and ‘nested’ Theil decomposition by
subgroups (‘rich’ and ‘non-rich’) and labour income sources (standard, self-
employed and atypical).32 For each wave: (i) the rows ‘Within’ and ‘Between’ indi-
cate how much of the income source contributions (columns) can be imputed to
intra- or inter-groups differences; (ii) the rows labeled ‘Non-rich’ and ‘Rich’ specify
how the incomes in the lower and upper parts of the annual distributions affect each
of the above two components; (iii) the ‘Source dec.’ row displays the income source
contributions resulting from the one-dimensional decomposition rule. Because of the
additive property of equation (4), the absolute values sum up both vertically and
horizontally; the percent values are calculated with respect to total inequality
(‘Source dec.’) as well as ‘Within’ and ‘Between’ components.
The within-group component of labour income inequality increased from more
than 49% in 2005 to around 57% in 2008, while it reduced in 2010. The standard
decomposition by income sources highlights the fundamental role played by the self-
employed in shaping total income inequality, even though their relative impact
decreased steadily from 112% to less than 68%. The contribution due to income from
standard work was slightly negative in 2005 and positive in the following three
waves. In particular, at the end of the observed period it reached a signiﬁcant value of
about 37%. Income stemming from atypical work made marked negative
contributions in 2005 and 2006, and weakened in the following two waves.
Proportion of 2008
R
el
at
iv
e 
de
ns
ity
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Figure 5. Comparison between 2008 and 2010 Italian labour income distributions: the mean
shift effect.
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The contribution to overall inequality of standard incomes shifted from negative
to positive by a change of sign of the between-group component (from around
10% in 2005 to approximately 13% in 2008) and, only in 2010, because of the
Table 3. Summary statistics and inequality measures by population subgroups and income
sources.a
Non-richb Richc Standard Self-employed Atypical Gross inc.
2005d
Pop. share 0.772 0.228 0.648 0.223 0.129 1.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) –
Inc. share 0.544 0.456 0.581 0.331 0.088 1.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) –
Rel. mean 0.704 1.999 0.897 1.482 0.682 1.000
(0.009) (0.028) (0.012) (0.036) (0.016) –
Theil 0.067 0.191 0.090 0.450 0.165 0.249
(0.002) (0.017) (0.005) (0.025) (0.012) (0.014)
Gini 0.185 0.302 0.210 0.498 0.295 0.337
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
2006d
Pop. share 0.776 0.224 0.630 0.189 0.181 1.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) –
Inc. share 0.563 0.437 0.598 0.283 0.119 1.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) –
Rel. mean 0.725 1.954 0.948 1.497 0.659 1.000
(0.009) (0.029) (0.012) (0.043) (0.014) –
Theil 0.067 0.172 0.090 0.414 0.173 0.225
(0.002) (0.020) (0.005) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015)
Gini 0.190 0.278 0.211 0.477 0.305 0.323
(0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007)
2008d
Pop. share 0.735 0.265 0.640 0.176 0.184 1.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) –
Inc. share 0.509 0.491 0.602 0.272 0.126 1.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) –
Rel. mean 0.692 1.853 0.941 1.545 0.683 1.000
(0.012) (0.031) (0.016) (0.063) (0.020) –
Theil 0.075 0.236 0.097 0.524 0.283 0.270
(0.003) (0.027) (0.007) (0.044) (0.050) (0.021)
Gini 0.197 0.300 0.215 0.518 0.332 0.339
(0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019) (0.017) (0.010)
2010d
Pop. share 0.920 0.080 0.655 0.182 0.163 1.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) –
Inc. share 0.746 0.254 0.644 0.240 0.116 1.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) –
Rel. mean 0.810 3.187 0.983 1.320 0.711 1.000
(0.011) (0.107) (0.013) (0.048) (0.023) –
Theil 0.089 0.254 0.173 0.480 0.223 0.269
(0.002) (0.028) (0.022) (0.041) (0.039) (0.019)
Gini 0.222 0.334 0.245 0.505 0.313 0.334
(0.003) (0.020) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.008)
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data.
aFigures might not add up because of rounding.
bIncludes individuals with income \x^min.cIncludes individuals with income  x^min.dNumbers in round brackets: estimated standard errors.
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strong increase of the within-group inequality share (about 85%). Moreover, the
nested procedure allows us to impute most of this result to the inequality-increasing
contribution (nearly 27%) arising among the rich standard earners. The self-
employed inequality contribution fell over time mainly because of the decreasing
positive effects of the within-group components referred to the rich group. Finally,
with regards to the atypical workers we observe a nearly generalised negative contri-
bution, apart from a few but signiﬁcant exceptions. In particular, the rich incomes
accounted for positive between-group contributions over the entire period analysed,
whereas for the within-group inequality this is true only starting with the 2008
wave.
Table 4. Standard and nested decomposition of the Theil index by population subgroups
and income sources.a
Absolute values Percent values Subgroup
dec.
Standard
Self-
employed Atypical
Gross
inc. Standard
Self-
employed Atypical
Gross
inc.
2005
Non-richb 0.044 −0.001 −0.007 0.036 35.8 −0.8 −5.7 29.3 –
Richc −0.042 0.130 −0.001 0.087 −34.1 105.7 −0.8 70.7 –
Within 0.002 0.129 −0.007 0.123 1.6 104.9 −5.7 100.0 49.4
Non-richb −0.140 −0.026 −0.024 −0.190 −111.1 −20.6 −19.0 −150.8 –
Richc 0.127 0.177 0.013 0.316 100.8 140.5 10.3 250.8 –
Between −0.013 0.150 −0.012 0.126 −10.3 119.0 −9.5 100.0 50.6
Source dec. −0.011 0.279 -0.019 0.249 −4.4 112.0 −7.6 100.0 100.0
2006
Non-richb 0.048 0.001 −0.011 0.038 42.5 0.9 −9.7 33.6 –
Richc −0.037 0.112 0.000 0.075 −32.7 99.1 0.0 66.4 –
Within 0.011 0.112 −0.011 0.113 9.7 99.1 −9.7 100.0 50.2
Non-richb −0.126 −0.023 −0.032 −0.181 −112.5 −20.5 −28.6 −161.6 –
Richc 0.137 0.142 0.013 0.293 122.3 126.8 11.6 261.6 –
Between 0.011 0.119 −0.018 0.112 9.8 106.3 −16.1 100.0 49.8
Source dec. 0.022 0.232 −0.029 0.225 9.8 103.1 −12.9 100.0 100.0
2008
Non-richb 0.050 −0.002 −0.010 0.038 32.5 −1.3 −6.5 24.7 –
Richc −0.043 0.144 0.015 0.116 −27.9 93.5 9.7 75.3 –
Within 0.007 0.142 0.005 0.154 4.5 92.2 3.2 100.0 57.0
Non-richb −0.133 −0.018 −0.036 −0.187 −114.7 −15.5 −31.0 −161.2 –
Richc 0.148 0.137 0.018 0.303 127.6 118.1 15.5 261.2 –
Between 0.015 0.119 −0.018 0.116 12.9 102.6 −15.5 100.0 43.0
Source dec. 0.022 0.261 −0.012 0.270 8.1 96.7 −4.4 100.0 100.0
2010
Non-richb 0.076 0.003 −0.014 0.066 58.0 2.3 −10.7 50.4 –
Richc 0.036 0.024 0.005 0.065 27.5 18.3 3.8 49.6 –
Within 0.112 0.027 −0.008 0.131 85.5 20.6 −6.1 100.0 48.7
Non-richb −0.116 −0.019 −0.021 −0.157 −84.1 −13.8 −15.2 −113.8 –
Richc 0.105 0.174 0.016 0.295 76.1 126.1 11.6 213.8 –
Between −0.012 0.155 −0.005 0.138 −8.7 112.3 −3.6 100.0 51.3
Source dec. 0.101 0.182 −0.014 0.269 37.5 67.7 −5.2 100.0 100.0
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data.
aFigures might not add up because of rounding.
bIncludes individuals with income \x^min.cIncludes individuals with income  x^min.
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4. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the distribution of labour earnings in Italy using
four waves of data from the Participation Labour Unemployment Survey (PLUS), a
sample survey on the Italian labour market supply. The main results are brieﬂy sum-
marised below.
First, we have found that the shape of the Italian labour income distribution in
any one year of the analysis is highly skewed to the right with a ‘fat’ and long upper
tail, a feature pointing to the existence of a relatively small number of very well-paid
individuals. This has called into question the use of the traditional Pareto model to
properly separate the group of the rich from poorer workers.
Second, in order to shed light on the roots of the labour income inequality, we
have carried out a nested decomposition of the Theil inequality measure that empha-
sised the twofold role played by sources of labour income and their distribution
among the groups of rich and non-rich earners. The results highlighted the decisive
role played by self-employment income in shaping total inequality through large
positive effects coming from high earning receivers. Earnings from standard employ-
ment also exhibited positive contributions due to income disparities concentrated in
the bulk of the annual distributions. Atypical earnings affected inequality negatively
in each year, with limited positive contributions made by the rich group.
We believe that the high level of earnings inequality is not inevitable, and policy
choices can contribute to reduce it.33 Consistently with country-speciﬁc features,
labour market policies should jointly take care of the labour income increase and its
fair distribution, pursuing at the same time improvements in labour productivity,
skill premium, returns on educational investment and employment conditions.
Accordingly, our results provide some clear policy indications.
In particular, the following property holds from our decomposition methodol-
ogy: increasing the income share of a source which contributes negatively
(positively) to total inequality would imply, ceteris paribus, an overall equalising
(disequalising) effect.34 This suggests, for example, that an increase of ‘non-stan-
dard’ earnings would decrease the total level of inequality. As already mentioned
before, several empirical studies veriﬁed the existence of a signiﬁcant wage gap
between ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ wages in Italy, mainly due to the adoption of
non-standard forms of contracts squarely focused on labour cost reduction rather
than other legitimate motivations.35 In this context, policies interventions should
discourage opportunistic employer’s hiring practices. Inequality could decrease as
soon as atypical employment relationships would concern genuine professionals,
which are expected to earn more than ‘economically dependent workers’.
Likewise, an increase of standard earnings among the ‘non-rich’ would involve
less total inequality. This might represent a desirable policy option for less-protected
and low-paid employees such as women, immigrants and young workers whose low
earnings are not always justiﬁed by shorter working hours or lower productivity.36
More in general, minimum wage protection policies, purchasing power preservation
systems, as well as the adoption of contrast measures for preventing various
discrimination and irregular practices could contribute to reducing earnings
differences.37
Furthermore, the signiﬁcant self-employed contribution to total labour income
inequality suggests supporting a ﬁrm’s business. In particular, desirable policy
decisions could promote easier and timely credit concessions able to enhance
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innovation investments and size development of small ﬁrms. The ﬁnal objective
should be the higher proﬁtability of secondary employers lying on the lower side of
the earnings distribution, which would certainly contribute to narrow self-employed
inequality.
Finally, our analysis seems to highlight preliminary effects on inequality due to
the ongoing economic crisis. Between 2008 and 2010, the self-employed accounted
for a deﬁnitely lower income share, relative mean and earnings dispersion that alto-
gether pushed down the inequality contribution of this source. Such results can be
ﬁrstly motivated by minor economic opportunities and consequential smaller mone-
tary returns implied by the economic situation. Taken together with the increase of
the self-employed population share (see Table 3), this is compatible with employ-
ment ﬂows from atypical to self-employment positions. In other words, the negative
economic conjuncture may have induced, once more, a substitution of non-standard
employees (largely uncovered by labour legislation) with autonomous ‘false’ posi-
tions in order to reduce labour costs. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that total
inequality decreased only by a few points between 2008 and 2010. Our results sug-
gest that this was mainly due to the increasing dispersion of standard earnings,
which occurred simultaneously with the slight increases of their income share and
relative mean. The reason behind this event should again reside in the segmentation
of the Italian productive system, characterised by high performing sectors, which
can also sustain employees’ earnings during a negative conjuncture, along with oth-
ers made up of less effective (or ineffective) ﬁrms, forced to select among worker
ﬁring and severe earning cuts.
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Notes
1. Employment growth continued even in 2008, when the current crisis unfolded in the
ﬁnal quarter of the year. However, some traces of it are already visible in the increase of
the unemployment rate to about 6.7% in the same year. Since then, the Italian unem-
ployment rate started to steadily increase to 7.8% in 2009 and 8.4% in 2010 and 2011
(Ciccarone and Damioli 2012).
2. For instance, Lucidi (2007) and Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2010) estimate that the average
annual increase of labour productivity, which has systematically lagged behind the aver-
age of 15 European Union, slowed down from around 1.9% in the 1992–1996 period to
approximately 0.9% in the years 1996–2000, and came close to zero in 2000–2004. In
addition, as maintained by Codogno (2009), since the mid-1990s – and especially in the
early 2000s – the reduction in the contribution of labour productivity to GDP growth
more than offset the positive contribution of labour utilisation, hence resulting in weak
overall GDP growth.
3. Traditional wage-setting institutions like collective bargaining affect workers
predominantly at the bottom or middle of the wage distribution. By contrast,
wage-setting mechanisms of high executives (the ‘working rich’) concern workers at the
very top of the distribution. The importance of executive compensations to explain the
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rise in top income shares during the last quarter of the twentieth century has been a
standard result in all the studies analysing income concentration within the top groups
in Anglo-Saxon countries. A tentative explanation explored by Piketty and Saez (2003,
2006) but see also Lemieux 2008 and Lemieux et al. 2009) is that the growth in perfor-
mance-related schemes – which affect the compensation of high executives – and the
change in social norms – regarding inequality and the acceptability of very high wages
– have removed some implicit barriers to the rise of incomes for the very highest earn-
ers. However, the surge experienced by top incomes in continental Europe and other
advanced countries such as Japan has been small relative to existing estimates for
English-speaking countries, and even the results for Italy are fairly modest (Alvaredo
and Pisano 2010).
4. Indeed, a previous law (368/2001) had been introduced with the explicit objective of
liberalising signiﬁcantly the employers’ use of temporary contracts – by reducing the
need of giving a justiﬁcation for the use of ﬁxed-term work relationships.
5. Alternatively, employers can outsource tasks to single individuals who are formally
independent but actually ‘economically dependent’ on the ﬁrm.
6. Likewise, some structural problems characterising the Italian labour market appeared to
be almost unaffected by this ‘employment miracle’, which was unevenly distributed
across sex and regions: unemployment in the South remained in fact very high
compared with the Central and Northern regions, and even though the female compo-
nent reduced its distance from the male counterpart, the women’s labour market position
remained quite unfavourable, notably in the Southern regions (see for example Checchi
2014).
7. The magnitude of the wage restraint period appears signiﬁcant also in an international
comparison, where Italy ranked bottom among industrialised countries for real wage
growth during the decade 1992–2002 (Zenezini 2004).
8. This dualism has also been worsened by: the uneven unemployment insurance schemes
in use – wage supplementation funds, such as the Cassa integrazione guadagni, are in
fact limited to workers with certain contracts, generally employed in large ﬁrms within
speciﬁc sectors of the industry; the dissimilar occupational prospects they deal with; the
low predisposition of the ﬁrms to invest in the human capital of atypical workers
(Ballarino et al. 2013), especially during negative economic conjunctures (Cutuli and
Guetto 2013).
9. See Rani (2008) for an attempt to assess the extent to which changes in employment
patterns are associated with the rise in income inequality observed over the past two
decades in the majority of countries. As for Italy, see Ballarino et al. (2013).
10. The Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL) is
a research institute connected to the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and
member of the Italian National Statistical System (SISTAN). The PLUS survey is
included in the Italian National Statistical Programme (NSP), the SISTAN tool for plan-
ning statistical activity of public interest. For a collection of various research results on
the Italian labour market conducted by ISFOL using this dataset, see Mandrone and
Radicchia (2005, 2012). The PLUS data are available at no cost by sending a request
email to plus@isfol.it.
11. The age range was 15–64 for the 2005 wave. Furthermore, starting with the 2006 wave,
a panel section consisting of a large number of observations (about 65%) was addition-
ally provided.
12. In Italy, information on labour market characteristics can be obtained from various
sources. Two prominent examples are the Labour Force Survey (LFS, http://www.istat.it/
en/archive/36394), conducted quarterly by the National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT),
and the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP, http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip/
whip_datahouse.php?lingua=eng), built from a sample of microdata from the administra-
tive archives of the National Institute of Social Security (INPS). However, while the for-
mer considers the household as a sampling unit, the latter includes microdata on private
sector employees only.
13. See for example Corsetti and Mandrone (2010) and Mandrone and Marocco (2012) for
applications related to this issue.
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14. This variable is in current year euros (€) and we use the consumer price index for the
whole nation (NIC) based on the year 1995 in order to obtain distributions of ‘real’
income. The series of the NIC index is publicly available on the ISTAT's website at the
address: http://www.istat.it/it/ﬁles/2011/02/indici_nazionali_nic_tuttilivaggr.xls. Further-
more, because of the complex sampling design of the PLUS survey, data make use
throughout the analysis of appropriate sampling weights to produce representative esti-
mates and correct standard errors and statistical tests. The expansion weights coming
with the PLUS survey are calibrated using GREG estimation Deville and Sarndal
(1992), which guarantees reduction of sample selection bias, small estimation variance
and large consistency with the standard labour market indicators derivable from the
ISTAT’s LFS survey.
15. Other employment relationships that may be included in this category are ﬁxed-term
contracts, job on call, job sharing and temping work provided by employment agencies.
16. For instance, the PLUS survey allows us to single out workers economically dependent
on a single employer, subject to compulsory daily presence, using employer's equip-
ment and performing the same tasks as some of their fellows. They are contractually
treated as ‘autonomous’ workers, but any speciﬁc skills, professional knowledge or spe-
ciﬁc competencies are not actually needed.
17. The deﬁnition closest to the existing literature would specify, usually arbitrarily, a per-
centage of the total income (like the top 1%, 5%, 10% or even 20%) and identify the
population found above and below this threshold as, respectively, the ‘rich' and ‘non-
rich’. Also, the deﬁnition could take an arbitrary number of persons – as in the UK Sun-
day Times list of richest people, or have a minimum cut-off value in order for a person
to qualify as ‘rich’ – as in the US ‘Forbes 400’ list. Other alternatives based on the
position in the income distribution could use the deviation from the mean (median)
income or a multiple of this quantity as a parameter, deﬁning the ‘rich’ – and, comple-
mentarily, the ‘non-rich’ – as those whose incomes are beyond a determined amount of
standard deviation in relation to the average (median) of the distribution, or those who
have more than x times the mean (median) income.
18. An extensive historical survey of the use of the Pareto distribution in the context of
income and wealth distributions can be found for example in Arnold (1983). For the
mathematics of the Pareto distribution see Kleiber and Kotz (2003).
19. In practice, we perform 100 such bootstrap samplings.
20. One of the features of the K-S statistic is that its distribution is known for datasets truly
drawn from any given distribution. This allows one to write an explicit expression in
the limit of large n for the p-value. Unfortunately, this expression is only correct so long
as the underlying distribution is ﬁxed (see for example Stephens 1986). If, as in our
case, the underlying distribution is itself determined by ﬁtting to the data and hence var-
ies from one dataset to the next, we cannot use this approach, which is why the Monte
Carlo procedure described in the main text is instead recommended.
21. Note crucially that for each synthetic dataset we compute the K-S statistic relative to
the best-ﬁt Pareto model for that dataset, not relative to the original distribution from
which the dataset was drawn. In this way we ensure that we are performing for each
synthetic dataset the same calculation that we performed for the real dataset, a crucial
requirement if we wish to get an unbiased estimate of the p-value (Capasso et al. 2009).
22. See for example Cowell (1980a,b) and Shorrocks (1984).
23. Following Morduch and Sicular (2002), a rule of factor decomposition satisﬁes the
property of uniform addition if it registers strictly negative contributions to overall
inequality for any income component equally distributed and positive. In this regard,
Podder (1993) claims that it is reasonable to think that the addition of a constant to all
incomes leads to a reduction in inequality if we accept relative measures. See also Shor-
rocks (1982, 1983) and Paul (2004) on this issue.
24. The weights are proportional to the actual population of the strata from which the
sample observations are drawn from. In the PLUS survey, strata are deﬁned by region,
type of city (metropolitan/not metropolitan), age (ﬁve classes), sex and employment
status (employed, unemployed, student, retired, other inactive/housewife). A detailed
description of the sampling design and strategy of the survey is contained in
Giammatteo (2009).
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25. Notice that when the unweighted formulation is adopted we simply have pi ¼ 1nk and
Pk ¼ nkn .
26. The mth source inequality is, instead, given by Tm ¼ 1n
Pn
i¼1
yim
lm
ln yi
m
lm
.
27. Simpler but less precise approaches are given by: (i) analyses of the relation between
inequality and public policies through the use of dispersion graphs between inequality
indices and country expenditures for social security (see Beblo and Knaus 2001); (ii)
pre- and post-transfer inequality computations in order to assign factor contributions as
relative difference between the two values (see Keane and Prasad 2002, and Forster
et al. 2003). As emphasised by Lerman (1999, p. 341), the latter approach ‘can yield
misleading results’.
28. The so-called ‘Hill plot’ is a visual diagnostic tool charting the Hill estimate of the
shape parameter a^H for each xmin. The idea is to visually identify a region where the
plot levels off, representing a stable estimate of a, and then choose xmin as the begin-
ning of that region (see for example Beirlant et al. 2004).
29. Since a log-transformed Pareto random variable is exponentially distributed, the coordi-
nates of the points on a Pareto Q-Q plot follow immediately from the exponential case
by taking the transformation ln Xxmin ExpðaÞ.
30. For our purposes, the ‘relative distribution’ is deﬁned as the ratio of the income density
in the comparison year (2010) to the income density in the reference year (2008) evalu-
ated at each quantile of the reference distribution, and can be interpreted as the fraction
of the comparison population that falls in each quantile of the reference population.
This allows us to identify and locate the changes that have occurred in the entire Italian
labour income distribution between the two years. In particular, when the fraction of
individuals in a quantile is higher (lower) than the fraction in the reference year, the rel-
ative distribution will be higher (lower) than 1. Where there is no change, the relative
distribution will be ﬂat at the value 1. Furthermore, this approach also allows us to
decompose the relative density into changes in location and changes in shape, in order
to emphasise differences between the comparison and the reference populations that
could be attributed to a change in the average (or median) income or to changes of the
shape (including differences in variation, skewness and other distributional characteris-
tics). We refer the reader to Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) for a more formal deﬁ-
nition of the relative distribution.
31. Alternative indices, such as the median, can be considered. The corresponding results
do not differ in a signiﬁcant way and are not reported here.
32. A similar decomposition exercise using the Gini index is presented for robustness pur-
poses in Appendix B.
33. In general, more policy options are available when the disposable income is the studied
variable. This allows taking into consideration the distributional effects of government
taxes and transfers and other private incomes (e.g. ﬁnancial revenues) responsible for
economic inequality.
34. For a detailed discussion of this point see Giammatteo (2007).
35. Coordinated and project collaborations should be related to the execution of time-lim-
ited objectives or requests for speciﬁc qualiﬁcations (consultants); ﬁxed-term contracts
should be adopted for replacing the temporary absence of an existing employee (e.g.
childcare purposes) or for dealing with an evident loss of ﬁrm’s proﬁtability (after an
agreement with local trade unions).
36. See OECD (2012).
37. Some empirical ﬁndings provide evidence of the irregular practice of underreporting the
number of paid working days, as some ﬁrms can reduce hourly wage without violating
the minimum requirements (Contini et al. 2008).
38. Each individual only belongs to one group and the overall population is entirely cov-
ered by the K groups.
39. Hereafter, we exclude the trivial case of constant distributions, i.e. Y 6¼ enl, where
en ¼ ð1; 1; . . . ; 1Þ. Moreover, for each of the sub-income distribution Ym the following
minimum requirement is always satisﬁed: ymi  0, and ymj > 0 at least for one j.
40. Following Dagum’s (1997) Gini decomposition by subgroups, this method yields a gross
between-group component, Ggb, which is different from the standard between-group
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measure (say Gb) in the sense that the former gauges all pairs of income differences
between agents across different groups, whereas the latter gives the inequality between
the mean incomes of the groups. The gross between-group component is also decompos-
able as Ggb ¼ Gb þ Gt, where Gt measures the inequalities between the subgroups lim-
ited to the overlap between their distributions. Since in our case the subgroup income
distributions do not overlap, gross and standard between-group inequalities coincide.
Therefore, in the text we shall use the expression ‘between-group inequality’ without any
qualiﬁer.
41. We may note here that this technique is not appropriate to assess the contribution of an
income source of a precise subgroup to the between-group inequality. The breakdown
of the Gini coefﬁcient is thus not fully accomplished, since it does not entail the estima-
tion of the combinations ‘inequality between subgroups / due to source m of subgroup
k’ – which is instead possible by using the nested Theil decomposition method.
42. The estimates of the marginal effects that every income source has on the Gini index of
income inequality have been obtained by using the approach proposed by Lerman
Yitzhaki (1985).
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Appendix A: Derivation of the nested decomposition rule
Consider a total distribution of income, Y , and a population of n units (individuals or
households) divided into K mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups38 receiving income
from M different sources, Ym, such that
Y ¼
Xn
i¼1
yi ¼
XK
k¼1
Xnk
i¼1
yik ¼
XK
k¼1
Xnk
i¼1
XM
m¼1
ymik
where ymik is the amount of Y
m received by the unit i of group k.39Given the Theil well-known
formula
TðY Þ ¼ 1
n
Xn
i¼1
yi
l
ln
yi
l
a nested decomposition rule can be derived through the following three simple steps
(Giammatteo 2007).
1. The basic source-based decomposition of the Theil is
TðY Þ ¼ 1
n
Xn
i¼1
yi
l
ln
yi
l
¼
XM
m¼1
1
n
Xn
i¼1
ymi
l
ln
yi
l
 !
¼
XM
m¼1
TðmÞ
where ymi is the amount of Y
m received by the unit TðmÞ ¼ 1n
Pn
i¼1
ymi
l ln
yi
l and is the generic
pseudo-Theil for the income source m.
2. The standard subgroups decomposition of the Theil index is given by
TðY Þ ¼
XK
k¼1
pksk ln
lk
l
þ
XK
k¼1
pksk
1
nk
Xnk
i¼1
yik
lk
ln
yik
lk
 !
¼ TbðY Þ þ TwðY Þ
where pksk ¼ nkn lkl is the income share of group k. Notice that the ﬁrst term, TbðY Þ,
contributes nothing only if sk ¼ 1, 8k; in all other cases it will be strictly positive. The
second term, TwðY Þ, which corresponds to the weighed mean of the K sub-indices
Tk ¼ 1nk
Pnk
i¼1
yik
lk
ln yiklk , is also never negative and reaches its minimum (zero) only in the case
of equally distributed incomes inside each subgroup of the population.
3. By considering the following additivity in sub-means
lk ¼
XM
m¼1
lmk (A1)
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we are able to divide the between-group component of total inequality into M source
contributions as
Tb ¼
XM
m¼1
XK
k¼1
nk
n
lmk
l
ln
lk
l
 !
¼
XM
m¼1
TbðmÞ (A2)
where nkn
lmk
l is the m source share of total income for the subpopulation
TbðmÞ ¼PKk¼1 nkn lmkl ln lkl : and is the pseudo-Theil index computed on the K subgroup
means. Following a similar procedure, but considering the individual income relations
yik ¼
PM
m¼1 y
m
ik instead of (A1), we can decompose the within-group component of the
Theil index by income sources as
Tw ¼
XM
m¼1
XK
k¼1
pksk
1
nk
Xnk
i¼1
ymik
lk
ln
yik
lk
 !" #
¼
XM
m¼1
TwðmÞ (A3)
where TwðmÞ ¼PKk¼1 pkskTkðmÞ is a weighted sum of K pseudo-Theil indices
TkðmÞ ¼ 1nk
Pnk
i¼1
ymik
lk
ln yiklk .
Expressions (A2) and (A3) allow us to derive the following subgroup-source nested
decomposition of the Theil index
TðY Þ ¼ Tbþ Tw ¼
XM
m¼1
TbðmÞ þ
XM
m¼1
TwðmÞ
where TbðmÞ and TwðmÞ represent, respectively, the contribution to between- and
within-group inequality coming from the m income component.
Appendix B: The Gini multi-decomposition
In this appendix, we test the robustness of the results of our decomposition exercise by
applying a multi-decomposition of the Gini index based on the technique proposed by
Mussard (2004, 2006).
The Gini index multi-decomposition is a subgroup Gini decomposition in which both the
within-group (Gw) and the between-group (Ggb) elements are further decomposed by income
sources, i.e.
G ¼
XM
m¼1
ðGmw þ GmgbÞ
where Gmw and G
m
gb are respectively the contributions of the mth source to Gw and Ggb.
40
The advantage of the Gini multi-decomposition is similar in spirit to that used for the
Theil index: instead of looking only at the ‘margins’ – either the contribution of source m or
the contribution of subgroup k to the overall amount of inequality G – the multi-decomposi-
tion provides the contribution of the mth source of the within- and between-group inequalities
that account for the global Gini index. In other words, unlike marginal decompositions, it is
possible to appreciate the contribution of a particular source of a precise subgroup to the
overall amount of inequality and estimate the contribution of a source to the between-group
disparities.41
The results stemming from application of this methodology to the PLUS data can be
assessed by inspection of Table B1, whose structure is the same as in Table 4. The (standard)
decomposition by income sources indicates that most of the inequality comes from self-
employment income, even if its contribution has been decreasing steadily over the years
(from more than 65% in 2005 to around 50% in 2010).42 The multi-decomposition allows us
to see that this source’s contribution largely comes from within the rich group – it accounts
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on average for about 24% of total within-group inequality, although the between-group con-
tribution is also quite large (more than 66% per year).
The marginal decomposition by population subgroups reveals that a large amount of
inequality comes from between the two groups of rich and non-rich workers – on average,
63% of total inequality. As noted above, when looking at the multi-decomposition it appears
that self-employment income contributed most to between-group disparities, while earnings
from standard forms of work seem to have played more inﬂuence through within-group
inequalities.
Needless to say, the results are as expected and adequately in line with those obtained
using the nested Theil decomposition method.
Table B1. Standard and multi-decomposition of the Gini index by population subgroups
and income sources.a
Absolute values Percent values Subgroup
dec.
Standard
Self-
employed Atypical
Gross
inc. Standard
Self-
employed Atypical
Gross
inc.
2005
Non-richb 0.077 0.006 −0.005 0.078 70.6 5.5 −4.6 71.6 –
Richc −0.004 0.035 0.001 0.032 −3.7 32.1 0.9 29.4 –
Within 0.073 0.041 −0.004 0.109 67.0 37.6 −3.7 100.0 32.3
Between 0.050 0.180 −0.002 0.228 21.9 78.9 −0.9 100.0 67.7
Source dec. 0.123 0.221 −0.006 0.337 36.4 65.4 −1.7 100.0 100.0
2006
Non-richb 0.082 0.008 −0.007 0.083 74.5 7.3 -6.4 75.5 –
Richc −0.004 0.030 0.001 0.027 −3.6 27.3 0.9 24.5 –
Within 0.078 0.038 −0.006 0.110 70.9 34.5 −5.5 100.0 34.1
Between 0.071 0.149 −0.007 0.213 33.3 70.0 −3.3 100.0 65.9
Source dec. 0.150 0.187 −0.013 0.323 46.3 57.7 −4.0 100.0 100.0
2008
Non-richb 0.077 0.004 −0.007 0.074 68.1 3.5 −6.2 65.5 –
Richc −0.002 0.038 0.002 0.039 −1.8 33.6 1.8 34.5 –
Within 0.075 0.042 −0.005 0.113 66.4 37.2 −4.4 100.0 33.2
Between 0.081 0.150 −0.004 0.226 35.8 66.4 −1.8 100.0 66.8
Source dec. 0.155 0.192 −0.009 0.339 45.9 56.7 −2.5 100.0 100.0
2010
Non-richb 0.149 0.015 −0.011 0.153 93.7 9.4 −6.9 96.2 –
Richc 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.007 1.3 2.5 0.6 4.4 –
Within 0.151 0.019 −0.010 0.159 95.0 11.9 −6.3 100.0 47.8
Between 0.039 0.131 0.005 0.174 22.4 75.3 2.9 100.0 52.2
Source dec. 0.190 0.150 −0.006 0.334 56.8 44.9 −1.7 100.0 100.0
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data.
aFigures might not add up because of rounding.
bIncludes individuals with income \x^min.cIncludes individuals with income  x^min.
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